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Abstract. The decoy-state high-dimensional quantum key distribution provides a
practical secure way to share more private information with high photon-information
efficiency. In this paper, based on detector-decoy method, we propose a detector-decoy
high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocol. Employing threshold detectors
and a variable attenuator, we can estimate single-photon fraction of postselected
events and Eves Holevo information under the Gaussian collective attack with much
simpler operations in practical implementation. By numerical evaluation, we show
that without varying source intensity and optimizing decoy-state intensity, our protocol
could perform much better than one-decoy-state protocol and as well as the two-decoy-
state protocol. Specially, when the detector efficiency is lower, the advantage of the
detector-decoy method becomes more prominent.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two authorized parties, called Alice and Bob,
to share private and secure information at a long distance [1, 2]. Since BB84 protocol
[3] was proposed, lots of work on enhancing the security of QKD has been done, such as
measurement-device-independent QKD [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and round-robin differential phase-
shift QKD [9]. Compared with two-level QKD protocols, high-dimensional quantum key
distribution (HD-QKD) [10] enables two parties to generate a secret key at a higher rate.
By encoding information in a high-dimensional photonic degrees of freedom, such as
position-momentum [10], time-energy [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] and orbital angular momentum
[16, 17, 18, 19], HD-QKD can share more information securely per detected single-photon
between two parties so as to improve the secret-key capacity under realistic technical
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constraints. Moreover, HD-QKD protocols could tolerate more noise than qubit QKD
protocols [20].
Recently, based on time-energy entanglement and dispersive optics, a so-called
dispersive optic HD-QKD [21] was proposed. It has been proven that the protocol is
secure against Gaussian collective attacks [22]. However, like most two-level general
QKD protocols, the security of HD-QKD would be influenced by some practical
imperfection. Under these imperfect conditions, the imperfect single-photon source
always emits multipair events, which causes the HD-QKD vulnerable to the photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [23, 24, 25] over lossy channels.
To avoid the PNS attack, decoy-state method is designed [26] and developed
[27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The central idea of the decoy-state method is to estimate
the channel transmission properties by choosing source intensity settings independently
and randomly. Recently, Zhenshen Zhang et al. [22] extended decoy-state analysis
to HD-QKD protocols with infinite number of decoy states. Darius Bunandar et al.
[33] proposed a finite decoy-state HD-QKD protocols and its finite-key analysis was
presented in Ref[34].
In this paper, by modifying Alices detection setups simply, we introduce the
detector-decoy method into the HD-QKD protocol. Compared with the original decoy-
state HD-QKD protocol, without varying the source intensity and optimizing decoy-
state intensity, the lower bound of single-photon fraction of postselected events and
the upper bound of the leaked information can still be obtained in the detector-decoy
HD-QKD. The basic idea of the method is to measure the incoming light pulses with a
set of detectors with different efficiencies. We use a variable attenuator to change the
transmittance of channel in Alices side so that the detector efficiency can be changed.
Borrowing realistic experimental parameters, we show by numerical evaluations that the
detector-decoy HD-QKD could perform much better than the one-decoy-state HD-QKD.
Besides, it performs as well as the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol, which can perform
as well as the HD-QKD protocol with an infinite number of decoy states. Although our
method is considered in the DO-QKD, the same arguments are also applicable to other
HD-QKD based on time-energy entanglement.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we describe the detector-decoy HD-
QKD protocol. In Sec. III, we propose a security analysis for HD-QKD. Then, in Sec.
IV we show the result of a numerical evaluation with realistic experimental constraints.
Finally, section V. concludes the paper with a summary.
2. Protocol description
In the original decoy-state protocol [33], there is an assumption that Eve cannot intrude
into Alice and Bobs experimental setups. This means that Eve just can attack the
quantum channel. The source is located in Alices side, so we could consider the photon
kept by Alice cannot be affected by Eve. The assumption is also needed in this paper.
The detector-decoy method is proposed firstly by Moroder et al. [35], which have
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Figure 1: Schematic of the detector-decoy HD-QKD setup. The source is located in
Alices side. Alice keeps one photon of the pair and sends the other to Bob. They both
choose to measure in either the arrival-time basis (case 1) or the frequency basis (case 2)
independently and randomly. Their results are only correlated or anti-correlated when
they choose the same basis. VA is a variable attenuator. ND is normal dispersion and
AD is anomalous dispersion.
showed the advantages and feasibility in QKD. Based on detector-decoy method, we
propose a detector-decoy HD-QKD scheme by modifying the Alices setup slightly as
shown in Fig. 1. Specially, our scheme only need one intensity of the source.
A time-energy entangled state could be produced by Alice weakly pumping the
SPDC source. We define σcor as the correlation time between two photons, which is
determined by the phase matching bandwidth of the SPDC source. Correspondingly,
we define σcoh as the coherence time of the pump field, which is typically far larger than
σcor. Thus, the number of alphabet characters per photon pulse, d = σcoh/σcor (the
Schmidt number) is large [36, 37].
The protocol is described as follow:
(i) State preparation: Alice chooses a transmittance of the VA randomly and
independently and then generates a biphoton state by SPDC. She keeps one of
the biphoton and sends the other to Bob via a quantum channel.
(ii) State measurement: Alice selects a basis between time basis and frequency basis
randomly and then measures her photon. After receiving the photon from Alice,
Bob also performs measurement as Alice and records the outcome.
(iii) Classical information post-processing: After all signals are transmitted, Alice
publishes her transmittance choice and both of them publish their basis choices
over an authenticated public channel. They establish their distilled key only from
correlated events acquired in the same basis. Alice and Bob would announce some
their measurement results to determine postselection probabilities and excess-noise
multipliers. Then Eves influence could be detected and they can determine their
information advantage over Eve. If the advantage is much greater than zero, they
then apply error correction and privacy amplification [36] on their data. As a result,
some amount of secret key can be established.
Detector-decoy high-dimensional quantum key distribution 4
3. Security analysis
In the decoy-state HD-QKD protocol, the postselection probability can be written as
[33]
Pµ =
∞∑
n=0
Prnγn. (1)
Here, µ is the intensity of Alices SPDC source and Prn is the probability of generating
n−photon pair. γn is the conditional probability of measuring at least one detection
given n−photon pairs are emitted. In our protocol, without Eves effect, γn can be
written explicitly as
γn = α
(η)
n βn = [1− (1− ηηAlice)n (1− pd)] [1− (1− ηBobηT )n (1− pd)] (2)
Here, α
(η)
n = [1− (1− ηηAlice)n (1− pd)] is the conditional probability of Alice registering
at least one detection when the transmittance of the variable attenuator is η and
βn = [1− (1− ηBobηT )n (1− pd)] is the conditional probability of Bob registering at
least one detection in a single measurement frame. ηAlice and ηBob are Alice and Bobs
detector efficiencies respectively. ηT is is the transmittance of the quantum channel and
pd is the dark count rate in a single measurement frame. Eve, in principle, has the
ability to affect the γn values by Eves effect only on βn while α
(η)
n is cannot be affected
due to the assumption.
The bound on the secure-key capacity is [22, 27, 33, 39]
∆I ≥ βI (A;B)− (1− F (η)µ ) IR − F (η)µ χUBζt,ζω (A;E) . (3)
Here,F
(η)
µ = µe−λα
(η)
1 β1/Pµ is the fraction of postselected events that are due to single
photon emissions, ζt and ζω are the value of time excess noise and frequency excess
noise respectively, which are caused by multiphoton emissions and dark counts. β is
reconciliation efficiency and I (A;B) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob.
IR is the shared information between Alice and Bob. χ
UB
ζt,ζω
(A;E) is an upper bound on
Eves Holevo information under Gaussian collective attacks due to the excess noise.
In our scheme, for simplicity, we use photon states under the transmittance η1 to
generate keys. We consider that the statistics of entangled photon-pair produced by
SPDC source are approximately Poissonian [40]. So in a single measurement frame,
when the mean photon-pair number is µ
Prn =
µn
n!
e−µ. (4)
To estimate Eve’s effect on βn, we request Alice to randomly change the
transmittance of the variable attenuator η between η1 and η2 (0 ≤ η2 < η1 ≤ 1).
3.1. Lower bound on F
(η1)
µ
We define P
(η)
µ as the postselection probabilities when the transmittance is η.
The postselection probabilities under the two different transmittance eta1 and η2
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(0 ≤ η2 < η1 ≤ 1) could be written by
P (η1)µ =
∞∑
n=0
Prnα
(η1)
n βn =
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
e−µ (1− (1− η1ηAlice)n (1− pd))βn. (5)
P (η2)µ =
∞∑
n=0
Prnα
(η2)
n βn =
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
e−µ (1− (1− η2ηAlice)n (1− pd))βn. (6)
Specially, when η = 1, P
(η)
µ is equivalent to Pµ in essence.
Then we will use the Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 to deduce a lower bound of β1.
eµP
(η1)
µ
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
− e
µP
(η2)
µ
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
= β0
[
pd
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
− pd
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
]
+ β1
[
1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µ− 1− (1− η2ηAlice) (1− pd)
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µ
]
(7)
+
∞∑
n=3
βn
[
1− (1− η1ηAlice)n (1− pd)
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µ− 1− (1− η2ηAlice)
n (1− pd)
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µ
]
.
The inequality
1− (1− η1ηAlice)n (1− pd)
1− (1− η2ηAlice)n (1− pd) ≤
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
(8)
for n ≥ 2 is satisfied given 0 ≤ η2 < η1 < 1. That means the equation
∞∑
n=3
βn
[
1− (1− η1ηAlice)n (1− pd)
1− (1− η1ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µn − 1− (1− η2ηAlice)
n (1− pd)
1− (1− η2ηAlice)2 (1− pd)
µn
]
≤ 0. (9)
Then Eq. 9 leads to the following inequality:
β1 ≥ βLB1 =
eµP
(η1)
µ
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− eµP
(η2)
µ
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
+ β0
[
pd
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− pd
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
]
1−(1−η1ηAlice)(1−pd)
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− 1−(1−η2ηAlice)(1−pd)
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
.(10)
Now we need to lower bound β0. As its shown in Ref[22, 33], under the assumption
that Eve cannot intrude into both experimental setups, the probability β0 cannot be
lower than the dark count rate no matter what Eve does:
β0 ≥ βLB0 = pd. (11)
Therefore, we can give rise to the fraction of postselected events that are due to single
photon emissions as:
F (η1)µ = α
(η1)
1 β1
µe−µ
P
(η1)
µ
≥ (1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)) (12)
×
P
(η1)
µ
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− P
(η2)
µ
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
+ e−µβLB0
[
pd
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− pd
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
]
P
(η1)
µ
[
1−(1−η1ηAlice)(1−pd)
1−(1−η1ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
− 1−(1−η2ηAlice)(1−pd)
1−(1−η2ηAlice)
2(1−pd)
]
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3.2. Lower bound on ζt and ζω
When Eve attacks Alices transmission, the decrease in measurement correlations of Alice
and Bob is caused, which is parameterized by the excess-noise factors ζt and ζω.
We consider the relation in Ref.[33]. Ωx (for x = t and ω) is the averaged excess-
noise multiplier, which can be measured by two authenticated parties and used to
estimate ζt and ζω by following equations:
Ωx = F
(η)
µ (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
1− F (η)µ
)
(13)
where x = t and ω.
The Eq. 13 can be diveded into two groups by transmittance η1 and η2, which can
be expressed as:
Ωx,η1 = F
(η1)
µ (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
1− F (η1)µ
)
, (14)
Ωx,η2 = F
(η2)
µ (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
1− F (η2)µ
)
. (15)
We multiply these two equations by P
(η1)
µ eµ and P
(η2)
µ eµ respectively, and then we have
Ωx,η1P
(η1)
µ e
µ = µα
(η1)
1 β1 (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
P (η1)µ e
µ − µα(η1)1 β1
)
, (16)
Ωx,η2P
(η2)
µ e
µ = µα
(η2)
1 β1 (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
P (η2)µ e
µ − µα(η2)1 β1
)
. (17)
Combing Eq. 16 and Eq. 17, we get
Ωx,η1P
(η1)
µ e
µ − Ωx,η2P (η2)µ eµ
=
(
α
(η1)
1 − α(η2)1
)
µβ1 (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
[
P (η1)µ e
u − P (η2)µ eu −
(
α
(η1)
1 − α(η2)1
)
µβ1
]
(18)
= (η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβ1 (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
[
P (η1)µ e
u − P (η2)µ eu − (η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβ1
]
≥ (η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβ1 (1 + ζx) ,
where the inequality comes from
P (η1)µ − P (η2)µ =
∞∑
n=0
{[(1− η2ηAlice)n − (1− η1ηAlice)n] (1− pd)}β1
≥ (η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβ1. (19)
Thus,
(1 + ζx) ≤
(
Ωx,η1P
(η1)
µ − Ωx,η2P (η2)µ
)
eµ
(η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβ1 ≤
(
Ωx,η1P
(η1)
µ − Ωx,η2P (η2)µ
)
eµ
(η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβLB1
(20)
for x = t and ω.
The upper bounds on ζt and ζω could be obtained from:
Ωx,η = F
(η)
µ (1 + ζx) + ∆Ωx
(
1− F (η)µ
) ≥ F (η)µ (1 + ζx)
=
[1− (1− ηηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η1)µ
[1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η)µ
F (η1)µ (1 + ζx) (21)
≥ [1− (1− ηηAlice) (1− pd)]P
(η1)
µ
[1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η)µ
FLBµ (1 + ζx)
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for η = η1 or η2. This inequality implies that
(1 + ζx) ≤ [1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)]P
(η)
µ Ωx,η
[1− (1− ηηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η1)µ FLBµ
(22)
Therefore, we can give the upper bounds on ζt and ζω as follows:
ζx ≤ ζUBx = min


(
Ωx,η1P
(η1)
µ − Ωx,η2P (η2)µ
)
eµ
(η1 − η2) ηAlice (1− pd)µβLB1
,
min
η∈{η1,η2}
{
[1− (1− η1ηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η)µ Ωx,η
[1− (1− ηηAlice) (1− pd)]P (η1)µ FLBµ
}}
− 1. (23)
Now with Eq. 12 and Eq. 23, we obtain a lower bound on Fµ and upper bound on
ζt and ζω.
4. Numerical evaluation
We borrow some realistic experimental parameters in the implementation of the HD-
QKD [41]: propagation loss α = 0.2 dB/km, detector timing jitter σJ = 20 ps, dark
count rate Rdc = 1000 s
−1, reconciliation efficiency β = 0.9, nR = log2 d. Therefore,
we could know the channel transmittance by the function ηT = 10
−αL/10. The detector
efficiencies of Alice and Bobs setups are assumed to be equal. Here we consider a specific
threshold detector, the superconducting nanowire single-photon detector, with the high
detection efficiencies ηAlice = ηBob = 0.93 [42].
We take coherent time σcor = 30 ps for all d values and correspondingly σcoh =
dσcor, which is easily controlled . We choose a single measurement frame duration
Tf = 2
√
ln 2σcoh [22]. For simplicity, we consider two excess-noise factors are equal,
ζt = ζω = ζ . The change in correlation time due to Eves interaction can be assumed to
be ∆σ =
(√
1 + ζ − 1)σcor = 10 ps [43], which doesnt lose generality.
In our detector-decoy method, we vary the transmittance of the variable attenuator
between η1 and η2, specifically η1 = 1 and η2 = 0.5. Here, we assume that events in
which both Alice and Bob click when η1 = 1 are used to encode information.
Here, we give a comparison between the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol with
average photon number µ = 0.1 when the dimension d = 8 and d = 32, which is shown
in Fig. 2 As one can see, the detector-decoy method can perform much better than
one-decoy-state HD-QKD and as well as the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol, which
means that the detector-decoy HD-QKD could work as the decoy-state HD-QKD with
infinite number of decoy states without the source intensity modulation or monitoring
photon numbers [34].
In general, the efficiency of conventional detectors used in QKD experiment is
always far lower than the efficiency of the superconducting nanowire single-photon
detector [44].So, we also give a comparison between schemes in the condition that is
limited with low detector efficiencies, especially ηAlice = ηBob = 0.045 shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3-1 plots the Fµ values that are obtained by detector-decoy method (blue solid
Detector-decoy high-dimensional quantum key distribution 8
Transmission distance (km)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
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1
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Owo-decoy-state HD-QKD
Detector-decoy method
d=8
(2-1)
Transmission distance (km)
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0
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1
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2
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One-Decoy-state HD-QKD
Detector-decoy method
d=32
(2-2)
Figure 2: (Color online) Lower bounds on the secure-key capacity in bits per coincidence
for (2-1) d = 8 and (2-2) d = 32 as a function of transmission distance at 10 km
increments. The results show that the detector-decoy method (black dash lines) could
perform much better than one-decoy-state HD-QKD (blue dash lines) and as well as the
two-decoy-state HD-QKD (red dotted lines).
Transmission distance (km)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
F
0.818
0.82
0.822
0.824
0.826
0.828
0.83
0.832
0.834
Detector-decoy-method
Two-decoy-state HD-QKD
(3-1)
Transmission distance (km)
0 100 200 300
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Two-decoy-state HD-QKD
Detector-decoy method
Alice Bob=4.5%
(3-2)
Figure 3: (Color online) (3-1) The Fµ values obtained by detector-decoy method (blue
solid lines) and two-decoy-state HD-QKD (red solid lines). (3-2) The secret key capacity
per coincidence for original decoy-state HD-QKD (red dotted lines) and detector-decoy
HD-QKD (black solid lines) as a function of the transmission distance when d = 8,
µ = 0.10 and ηAlice = ηBob = 0.045.
lines) and two-decoy-state HD-QKD (red solid lines) respectively. Fig. 3-2 shows the
comparison between two protocols. Both of them are plotted under the condition with
d = 8 and µ = 0.10.As the figure shown, when the detector efficiency is low, the
advantage of detector-decoy HD-QKD become prominent. That means the detector-
decoy HD-QKD could tolerate lower detector efficiency.
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5. Conclusion
The decoy-state method is applied to resist PNS attacks in HD-QKD systems. The
original decoy-state HD-QKD has proved that the two-decoy-state protocol can perform
as well as the protocol with infinite decoy states. In this paper, we proposed a detector-
decoy HD-QKD protocol that could offer certain practical advantages over the original
decoy-state HD-QKD protocol. Our scheme, using a variable attenuator, could achieve
secure information per coincidence as the two-decoy-state HD-QKD with little or no
compromise. In the two-decoy-state protocol, the intensity of weaker decoy states is
optimized for any particular transmission distance. However, in our scheme the source
intensity is constant and not required to be varied in our scheme. This is a main
advantage over the original scheme. Specially, if the detector efficiency is lower, the
advantage of our method become more prominent.
In realistic constraints, the detector-decoy HD-QKD presented in this paper
provides a more applicable and feasible scheme in the practical implementation of
the HD-QKD protocol with slight modification. The source intensity in our scheme is
constant and correspondingly we do not need to optimize the intensity of decoy states.
When the HD-QKD protocol with decoy states is implemented practically, our scheme
can perform as well as the original two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol but operations
are much simpler.
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